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HowARD LESNICK* 
The central problem that Ms. Stone addresses-a problem long thought 
troublesome for democratic theory-is the fundamental one of justification. 
In a society committed to democratic values and the equality of all people, 
how do we justify a working order committed to hierarchy, authority, and 
obedience? The theory that she calls industrial pluralism responds to the 
problem by suggesting that the workplace is not an enclave of private power 
and domination in an otherwise free and democratic society, but that it is 
rather a place subject to democratic processes much like those that prevail in 
our public life. As in the larger democracy, the conditions of the work place 
are said to prevail through the consent of the governed. 
The legislative analogy suggests that the parties bargain and mutually 
agree; although of course there are always winners and losers in particular 
cases, the system is basically a democratic one. It is justifiable for the 
winners to win, because of that process. 
The Stone paper accurately describes this function of the notion of 
industrial pluralism. I think that Ms. Stone is also right in asserting that, in 
fact, there is not substantial equality of power between employers and 
employees. While there may be particular companies where employees are 
very strong, in general there is substantia! inequality of power in one direc­
tion; and because the theory of industrial pluralism tends to mask this 
empirical truth, our attention tends to be diverted from it. 
This occurs in ways that are more complex than r can begin to spell out 
here. One method is what Ms. Stone calls privatization. By routing the 
setting of the substantive conditions of employment to negotiations that are 
regarded as private matters, generally not subject to legal regulation, we 
support the tendency not to care, as a society, about what the actual 
conditions of work are; vvhat the pay figures in the contract are, whether 
this particular contract has a subcontracting clause or not, and so on. Of 
course that response simply mirrors, in a very important \vay, the general 
process orientation of our liberal values, that is, the equation of fair proce­
dure with justice-the idea that, so long as the union had a fair opportunity 
to negotiate, the result is fair. 
David Feller, who effectively represented unions for many years, says 
that of course there is too much inequality. The point is that the prevailing 
structure of thought tends to keep pu lli ng us away from acknowledging 
that. David, your example is really an eloquent confirmation of that proc­
ess. The Baldwin Piano Works has a very tight management prerogatives 
clause, and of course you don't like it. No one accuses you of liking it, and 
no one accuses the theory of industrial pluralism of having caused it. Its 
cause is the power and militancy of the company. But the very example you 
use, ancl. the way you develop it, are the core of the problem we are 
----·------
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considering. Your account echoes, and reinforces, the tendency to view the 
state of affairs that prevails as legitimate and as presumptively just, or at 
least as a private matter. Indeed, you began to suggest-and then had to 
take it back-that for every Baldwin contract, there may be found one with 
an equal and opposite treatment, where the union has subcontracting but­
toned up tight. You took it back because you realize that such an assump­
tion is wildly fanciful; far from 50-50, or 40-60, or whatever, there are 
probably barely three percent of the second kind of contract and many, 
many examples like Baldwin. Because of your experience and outlook, the 
prevailing theory can do no more than tug at your sense of reality, but your 
example illustrates the power of the theory to divert our attention from the 
substantive conditions of work and tend to make us think that prevailing 
conditions are fair, acceptable, or at least the best we can expect. 
I want to comment briefly on the notion of joint sovereignty, another 
central and most interesting aspect of Ms. Stone's paper. It is clearly true 
that such a concept was very much the ethic of the people who attempted to 
structure a liberal labor law. And their vision was of something quite 
genuinely joint. To that degree, they were seeking to resolve the contradic­
tion between a political order committed to democratic participation by a 
fully enfranchised citizenry and an economic order committed to hierarchy 
and authority, by enfranchising workers to participate in the governance of 
their work life. What I take Ms. Stone to be saying-and what I think is true 
and central-is that although the notion of joint sovereignty presupposes a 
significant input from labor as well as management in determining the range 
of important labor relations questions, law and practice have not developed 
that way. 
That state of affairs is not a recent phenomenon. Those who follow 
labor law are very conscious, because of First National lvfaintenance1 and 
other cases and causes, of how the scope of mandatory bargaining seems to 
be suddenly collapsing. But there is a far longer relevant history. The Borg­
Warner2 decision established the principle that the outer limits of the scope 
of bargaining are defined and enforced by law. Of course ic is true, as David 
suggests, that unions can get around that decision (just as all people and 
institutions can get around legal restrictions to some significant degree). The 
fact remains that, not only are the outer limits of compelled bargaining set 
by the law, the decision to bargain in fact beyond that range is said by the 
law to be protected from economic pressure. The inner limits of actual 
bargaining, however, are explicitly made subject to economic power. Thirty 
years ago the American Nationa/Jnsurance3 decision accepted the principle 
I. first Nat'! Maintenanc•: Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (!98i). 
' NLR!3 \. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 3-�2. 3�8--+9 (1958). 
3. l\LRB \ .  !\mcrican Nat'! Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, ·fO-l-09 (!95.2). 
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that manaaement prerogatives clauses are negotiable. Management is there­
fore free t� use its economic power to contract the sphere of joint control, 
and labor is not legally free to use its power to expand it. 
The significance of American National Insurance goes far beyond the 
asymmetry I have described. There is a direct link between the principle of 
that decision and the Baldwin Piano Works. So long as an employer is 
willing to deal with its workers collectively, and to bargain in fact, the law 
leaves the actual fate of the principle of joint sovereignty to be decided by 
economic power. 
First National Maintenance makes clear the extent of the law's rejection 
of the premise of the principle of joint sovereignty, that the concept of 
mandatory bargaining will remain broad and fluid. It is very important to 
realize that it is not a sufficient answer to the question of the significance of 
that rejection, simply to regret or criticize it. Certainly, the decisions in­
volved were not inevitable, and might have come out differently but for a 
few too many unfortunate occupants of seats on the Supreme Court in 
recent years. That truth should not make us lose sight of the more basic fact 
that the decisions are neither accidents (of bad lawyering or bad facts) nor 
mavericks. There has been a long-term trend in the interpretation of the 
National Labor Relations Act, which tends to accommodate it increasingly 
to the ideological value system that gave rise to the need for the Act. That 
development is an extremely complex and fundamental matter, which two 
of this morning's panelists, Jim Atlcson and Karl Klare, have begun to write 
about in a challenging and thought-provoking way. As we approach the 
fiftieth anniversary of the passage of the Act in 1935, the time is certainly 
appropriate to attempt to examine the matter fully. l believe that, if we were 
to look at the duty to bargain (the good faith concept and the scope of 
mandatory bargaining), the right to strike, the jurisdiction of the Board, the 
election process, the grievance and arbitral processes, we would see a long­
term secular trend of increasing accommodation to values that predated the 
Act, and an increasing trivialization, if you will, of the reach of the Act. 
·what has happened to the scope of mandatory bargaining simply reflects 
that development. 
Of course it would be fatuous to blame that series of developments on 
the ideology of union lawyers or liberal academics, or to blame it on 
anyone. What is true, however, is that this long-term tendency is facilitated 
by the liberal ideology expressed, to a significant degree, by the notions of 
joint sovereignty and industrial pluralism. 
Arbitration is a good example. I believe that i\lls. Stone is right when 
she asserts that the ways in which arbitration tends to channel and institu-
tionalize conflict reenforce inequality. That does not at all deny that arbitra- (; 
tion also performs and was designed to perform functions that enhance 
accountability and limit discretion of management in ways that provide 
important protection to workers. But we have been trumpeting the values of 
arbitration in that second way for several decades now, and should be able 
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to find room at the same time to acknowledge that arbitration individualizes 
grievances and thereby tends to weaken the joint control idea. 
Moreover, we too easily lose sight of the extent to which arbitration has 
accommodated itself to the prevailing preference for order, authority and 
productivity, and the like. To say that grievants do very well in arbitration 
when they are fired is really to demonstrate the phenomenon eloquently. I 
don't think that thirty or forty years ago one would have reacted that way to 
the decisions that are coming dmvn today. When an employee is fired and 
eleven months later is reinstated without back pay, he or she has in a very 
real sense been fined ten or fifteen thousand dollars for an offense. There is 
almost no offense that an individual-especially one earning eighteen thou­
sand dollars a year-can commit in the public order that carries with it a 
fifteen thousand dollar fine. Yet that is not regarded as an extremely serious 
penalty; it is regarded as "getting off," but without back pay. 
Ms. Stone cites some arbitral awards from the twenties, some by Wil­
liam Leierson, one of the architects of the theory of industrial pluralism, 
that illustrate graphically how our frame of reference has shifted profoundly 
{if imperceptibly) over the years. In one, an arbitrator ordered the company 
not to lay people off, but to spread and share the work equally; another 
prevented subcontracting in the name of industrial self-government; one 
approved featherbedding devices for displaced workers; anot her ordered the 
discharge of supervisors as a response to a worker's complaint of abusive 
treatment. Our norms have changed little by little over the years, but enough 
time has gone by that the distance we have traveled has become vast. 
It is very difficult to understand that process of change, and the task is 
not one of assessing blame. What I think is true, however, is that doctrines 
like Lincoln A1ills1 and the Steelworker:; Trilogy'; began by serving the 
function of enhanced worker self-determination, and went on to clisserve it. 
Ms. S tone ' s unwillingness to give much creclcr1C\? to the first pan of that 
dynamic may justifiably get some of us oleic:· folk angry, but it is the 
rightness of the second part that ! have been paying attention to now and 
suggest that we ought to be willing to pay attcmion ro. 
The process is one by which the !a1\ has not challenged, but rather has 
tried to accommodate itself to, basic premises about work and democracy. 
One premise, of c o urse , is the equation ol· justice with process, which goes 
far- beyond labor law and is endemic to Lm, indeed endemic to public life. ,L\ 
second is our commitment to hierarchy as a necessary predica te of produc­
tion, a panicky fear that if we question hierarchy more than a certain 
minimal amou nt, \\T will soon all be li1 ing in rags, ;:mel ea t ing raw meat or 
(worse yet) raw \egetables. A third is our traditional consciousness of work, 
4. Tc\ti!c Wur�cr' Uniun '"- Lincu1n \lith llf .-\bbama. -''·' LJ.S. -14� ( 1957). 
5. L;nitcd Stc:C!\\<)!'kc·rs '-·. [nt•�rpri'c' \\.hcc·l S: C:tr Ct>rp .. _,(,3 L'.S. 593 ( !960): linitt·cl 
Stccil\cH-kc't·:- ' . \\:trric):· & Culf �a' ig:llion Cu .. 3h3 L1.S. 57-+ 11 ')(1t)): United Stc'Cii\Llrkc:·, \. 
·\mcricatl \it". Cll . .  3(,3 U.S. 56-+ tl960}. 
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which legitimates the view that we treat an employee not as a person, but as 
a portion of a person hiring out that portion to do a job. The liberal ideas of 
industrial pluralism and joint sovereignty, like our labor law, took on the 
job of doing the best they could in that world without challenging its 
premises. What Ms. Stone has done is to show us how little we can do 
without challenging those premises. 
